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Abstract
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Private Bag X1, Matieland 7602, South Africa.
Thesis: MScEng (Mech)
December 2014
Steganography is the art of hiding information inside a data host called the
cover. The amount of distortion caused by that embedding can inﬂuence the
security of the steganographic system. By secrecy we mean the detectability
of the existence of the secret in the cover, by parties other than the sender
and the intended recipient. Crandall (1998) proposed that coding theory (in
particular the notion of covering radius) might be used to minimize embedding
distortion in steganography. This thesis provides a study of that suggestion.
Firstly a method of constructing a steganographic schemes with small em-
bedding radius is proposed by using a partition of the set of all covers into
subsets indexed by the set of embeddable secrets, where embedding a secret s
is a maximum likelihood decoding problem on the subset indexed by s. This
converts the problem of ﬁnding a stego-scheme with small embedding radius
to a coding theoretic problem. Bounds are given on the maximum amount
of information that can be embedded. That raises the question of the rela-
tionship between perfect codes and perfect steganographic schemes. We deﬁne
a translation from perfect linear codes to steganographic schemes; the latter
belong to the family of matrix embedding schemes, which arise from random
linear codes. Finally, the capacity of a steganographic scheme with embed-
ding constraint is investigated, as is the embedding eﬃciency to evaluate the
performance of steganographic schemes.
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Uittreksel
On the eﬃciency of code-based steganography
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Tesis: MScIng (Meg)
Desember 2014
Steganograﬁe is die kuns van die wegsteek van geheime inligting in 'n data
gasheer genoem die dekking. Die hoeveelheid distorsie veroorsaak deur die
inbedding kan die veiligheid van die steganograﬁese stelsel beïnvloed. Deur
geheimhouding bedoel ons die opspoorbaarheid van die bestaan van die ge-
heim in die dekking, deur ander as die sender en die bedoelde ontvanger par-
tye. Crandall (1998) het voorgestel dat kodeerteorie (in besonder die idee
van dekking radius) kan gebruik word om inbedding distorsie te verminder in
steganograﬁe. Hierdie tesis bied 'n studie van daardie voorstel.
Eerstens 'n metode van die bou van 'n steganograﬁese skema met 'n klein
inbedding radius word voorgestel deur die gebruik van 'n partisie van die versa-
meling van alle dekkings in deelversamelings geïndekseer deur die versameling
van inbedbare geheime, waar inbedding 'n geheime s is 'n maksimum waarsky-
nlikheid dekodering probleem op die deelversameling geïndekseer deur s. Dit
vat die probleem van die vind van 'n stego-skema met klein inbedding ra-
dius na 'n kodering teoretiese probleem. Grense word gegee op die maksimum
hoeveelheid inligting wat ingebed kan word. Dit bring op die vraag van die
verhouding tussen perfekte kodes en perfekte steganographic skemas. Ons de-
ﬁnieer 'n vertaling van perfekte lineêre kodes na steganographic skemas; laas-
genoemde behoort aan die familie van matriks inbedding skemas, wat ontstaan
as gevolg van ewekansige lineêre kodes. Laasten, die kapasiteit van 'n stegano-
graﬁese skema met inbedding beperking word ondersoek, asook die inbedding
doeltreﬀendheid om die prestasie van steganograﬁese skemas te evalueer.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Cryptography provides the primary technique for the secure transmission of
information, and has ever since the existence of the secrets. In our digital age
it is no less important, in the form of public key cryptography, because of the
role the web plays in supporting data transmission. But even if the canonical
eavesdropper, Eve, is unable to decipher the messages passing between the
canonical communicators Alice and Bob, by traﬃc analysis, she is able to infer
more that Alice and Bob may want her to know: she observes that they are
passing encrypted data.
For that reason steganography, the hiding of information (typically en-
crypted for safety), plays an increasingly important part. By embedding their
secret in an innocuous ﬁle (like jpeg, video or audio ﬁle) Eve is unable to
observe anything untoward.
The word Steganography literally means covered or hidden writing, from
the Greek. Schneier et al. (1996) characterize steganography as a method that
serves to hide secret messages in other messages, such that the secret's very
existence is concealed. That is the existence of the hidden message is known
only by the sender and intended receiver. Thus is also known as the science of
invisible communication. A protocol which implements such a secret exchange
is called steganogrphic system. It consists of
1. The cover medium(C) that will hold the secret message.
2. The secret message (M), may be plain text, digital image ﬁle or any type
of data.
3. The stegonographic schemes (stego-scheme or embedding scheme), which
is a couple of functions Emb and Ext for embedding and recovering the
secret.
During the embedding process of a secret S, a carrier message X called the
cover is needed and then the embedding function Emb transforms the cover
X into an innocuous looking message Y that must appear undistinguishable
1
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Figure 1.1: A model of steganographic system.
from X. The output Y = Emb(X,S) is called the stego. A stego-key might be
needed to hide and recover the secret. It might be used to increase the security
of the steganographic system, by combining steganography with cryptography.
Figure 1.2: Steganography and Cryptography (Engle, 2003)
The main requirement of steganography, undetectability, means that an
attacker is able to distinguish between stego and cover objects with success no
better than random guessing, given the knowledge of the embedding function
and the source of the cover media. The formal deﬁnition of secure stegano-
graphic system was given by Cachin (1998). It is based on minimizing the
success probability of the adversary to guess whether or not a message is
steganographic. Detectability is inﬂuenced by many factors, such as the type
of the cover object, the selection of the places that could be modiﬁed dur-
ing embedding, the embedding operations, and the number of changes caused
by the embedding operation. If two embedding methods share the ﬁrst three
factors, then the one that introduces fewer changes will (typically) be less
detectable.
The most important problem in steganogarphy is formalizing that very con-
cept. Any formalization should provide a foundation for analysing detectability
of an embedded secret in a cover-text. It seems inevitable that information
theory be used. Cachin (1998) formalised detectability using relative entropy
(which has also been the concern of my previous work (Ralaivaosaona, May
2013)). Zöllner et al. (1998) used Shannon's mutual information. Many other
authors have studied this concept but they use one of the above approaches,
but mostly Cachin's.
The next important problems concern establishing bounds and results on
the eﬃciency, which is also has to be formalised. That includes the evaluation
of the hiding capacity which upper-bounds the rates of embeddable information
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and the fundamental trade-oﬀ between the achievable rates and the allowed
distortion. Ker et al. (2008) has established some results on the steganographic
capacity such as the square root law. Moulin and O'Sullivan (2003) introduced
a more general result on the hiding capacity of any information hiding case
with embedding constraint, which is a distortion parameter D. The strength
of the transparency constraint is controlled by that distortion parameter which
should (in general) be small, as embedding is intended to be imperceptible.
We follow the view that (in general) the fewer changes needed to embed a
secret in a cover-text, the lower the detectability. In this thesis coding theory
provides a model of embedding with minimum distortion.
Westfeld (2001) introduced the concept of embedding eﬃciency, which is
the expected number of random bits embedded per one embedding change. A
good scheme must have as high on embedding eﬃciency as possible. In 1998,
Crandall (1998) showed that embedding eﬃciency of steganographic schemes
can be improved by applying covering codes to the embedding process. In
particular, linear codes can be used to construct an embedding scheme whose
embedding capacity is the code redundancy, and the covering radius of the code
corresponds to the maximum number of embedding changes necessary to em-
bed any message. From then many authors have developed a theory connect-
ing coding theory and steganography. Galand and Kabatiansky (2003b) and
Munuera (2012) gave an explicit connection between a collection of codes and a
steganographic scheme, Zhang and Li (2005) introduced the notion of stegano-
graphic codes and explored the connection between maximum length embed-
dable (MLE) steganographic codes and perfect codes, and Westfeld (2001)
implemented Crandall's (Crandall, 1998) idea of F5 steganography.
The F5 algorithm is a practical method of embedding bits in digital images,
more precisely on the least signiﬁcant bits (LSB) of its pixel values. This
method has been known to resist statistical attack. It has reasonable eﬃciency
since it is capable of embedding k information bits in a sequence of 2k−1 pixels
(LSB's) by ﬂipping at most 1 pixel value. That is because it uses uses Hamming
codes to embed data, and this family of codes has redundancy k, length 2k−1
and covering radius 1. In term of coding theory, it is a very important family
of codes known as perfect codes, which can correct all errors up to the covering
radius. Hamming codes are single error correcting codes.
In this thesis, we focus on the construction of "good" stego-schemes. "Good"
in terms of minimizing the embedding impact in order to increase embedding
eﬃciency. Some ideas of Munuera (2012) will be used and extended in the
way I understand them. So the ﬁrst chapter is the formalisation of a better
scheme together with its construction. Then we will restrict that idea to a
coding theoretic method. It will become more interesting since we give some
bounds on the performance of the constructed stego-scheme from any code
(code-based steganography). Most of those bounds are derived from coding
theoretic bounds like Hamming bound, covering bound, etc. A specialization
of our construction is Crandall's (Crandall, 1998) matrix encoding. In this
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case, stego-schemes are constructed from linear codes. Linear codes have bet-
ter properties, therefore, we can easily express and compute the parameters of
matrix encoding (a scheme derived from random linear code) with respect to
the parameters of the code. We will see that some bounds on the performances
of code-based stego-schemes can be achieved by random linear codes.




Steganography is the method of hiding secret messages inside a cover-object1.
To communicate a secret covertly, Alice and Bob may proceed in three diﬀerent
ways.
 cover selection where the sender selects an appropriate cover-object that
will communicate the desired message. The choice of the cover-object
depends on the message to be hidden;
 cover synthesis in the case the embedder has to generate the cover-object
from the message to be hidden;
 cover modiﬁcation is used most frequently, where the embedder has some
large source of cover-objects and he embeds the message into an arbitrary
one by modifying some parts of it.
This thesis only focuses on embedding by cover modiﬁcation, where Alice
chooses a cover-object and then modiﬁes it (or part of it) in order to convey the
desired secret in a manner such that it is hidden. That is, after embedding has
taken place, the original and the altered cover-object or stego-object2 must be
seemingly identical so that no one apart from Alice and the receiver, Bob, could
be able to tell whether the transmitted message carries hidden information or
not. This means that stego and cover have to be statistically indistinguishable,
where statistical detectability of most steganographic schemes increases with
embedding distortion (Fridrich et al., 2007b). Therefore it is important for
Alice to embed the secret while introducing as small an impact to the cover
as possible.
1A cover-object consists a non speciﬁc carrier data. It can be an image, a text, or
sequence of symbols,. . . Sometimes we only use "cover" for simplicity.
2"Stego-object" refers to a message or object that contains secret information.
5
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 2. CONSTRUCTION OF GOOD STEGANOGRAPHIC SCHEMES6
Throughout this thesis, secrets and cover (and stego) are represented by
boldface symbols. This is to diﬀerentiate a symbol and a sequence of symbols
in the case where covers and/or secrets are sequences from an alphabet, that
we can consider as vectors. So boldface symbols also stand for vectors or
matrices. Calligraphic font is used for alphabets (or sets).
This chapter gives an overall idea of how to construct steganographic
schemes with small distortion and it is organised as follows. In Section 2.1,
basic deﬁnitions and notation on steganography are introduced. We give some
useful properties in Section 2.2. Then, Section 2.3 focuses on the constructions
of "good" schemes. We close the chapter by introducing a partial order on the
space of all embedding schemes deﬁned on the same set of covers and secrets.
2.1 Steganographic scheme (Stego-scheme)
We assume thatM is the set of all embeddable messages (or secrets), and X
the set of all cover-objects, such that3 |M| and |X | are ﬁnite with |M| < |X |.
Then we can deﬁne a stego-scheme as follows:
Deﬁnition 2.1. A stego-scheme S = (Emb,Ext;X ,M) is a pair of Embed-
ding, Emb, and Extracting, Ext, functions deﬁned between X andM:
Emb : X ×M→ X
Ext : X →M
such that for all x ∈ X and s ∈M,
Ext(Emb(x, s)) = s. (2.1.1)
y = Emb(x, s) is called the stego-object.
The embedding function Emb takes the cover-object x and the secret s
as its inputs and produces the stego-object in such a way that we can always
recover the secret from the resulting stego-object using the extracting function
Ext.
For a given embedding function, the cardinality, |M|, of the set M, is
the number of diﬀerent messages that can be communicated. The logarithm
log2 |M|, is called embedding capacity. Its unit is in bits and it is denoted by
h.
Deﬁning a distance d : X × X → [0,+∞), we measure the impact of
embedding (or embedding distortion) as follows.
Deﬁnition 2.2. Let S = (Emb,Ext;X ,M) be a stego-scheme. The embed-
ding distortion introduced to a cover x ∈ X by the function Emb in order to
hide the secret s ∈M is given by d(x, Emb(x, s)).
3|E| stands for the cardinality of the set E.
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We denote the expected embedding distortion taken over uniformly dis-
tributed secrets and covers by Ra, i.e.
Ra = E(d(x, Emb(x, s))). (2.1.2)
The worst-case embedding distortion is given by the embedding radius. It
gives the maximum possible distortion that can be made, over all possible
covers and secrets.
Deﬁnition 2.3. Let S = (Emb,Ext;X ,M) be a stego-scheme. The embed-
ding radius R of S is given by
R := max{d(x, Emb(x, s))|x ∈ X , s ∈M}. (2.1.3)
Obviously we have Ra ≤ R.
The eﬃciency of a stego-scheme is usually evaluated through its embedding
eﬃciency, which is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 2.4. (Westfeld, 2001) The embedding eﬃciency, e, is the expected
number of embedded bits per unit distortion. It is given by the ratio between





Similarly the lower embedding eﬃciency e is the ratio between embedding





Since R ≥ Ra, it follows that e ≤ e.
We can compare any two stego-schemes deﬁned on the same set of covers
and secrets by their embedding eﬃciencies. The one with smaller embedding
distortion is less detectable than the other. Similarly, the one with higher em-
bedding eﬃciency is better than the other. So given the two sets X andM, we
aim to design stego-schemes with maximal embedding eﬃciency. Equivalently,
we aim to minimize embedding distortion.
2.2 Property of stego-schemes
From Deﬁnition 2.1, we can derive the following properties on both embedding
and extracting function; Emb and Ext, given that the cover set is X and the
set of embeddable secrets isM.
Proposition 2.5. Let S = (Emb,Ext;X ,M) be a stego-scheme. Then
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1. Ext : X →M is a surjective function;
2. for each x ∈ X , the map Emb(x, .) :M→ X is injective.
Proof. The proof of both statements follows easily from Equation 2.1.1.
For any s ∈ M, we deﬁne the inverse image of the singleton {s} ⊂ M as
the set
Ext−1({s}) := {y ∈ X |Ext(y) = s}.
Since Ext is a surjective function, the union of all inverse images of each
singleton {s} ⊂ M of all elements ofM cover the whole space X . Moreover,
it partitions X since any two inverse images of two diﬀerent singletons {s}, {s′}
are disjoint. That is, for any distinct s, s′ ∈M,
Ext−1({s}) ∩ Ext−1({s′}) = ∅.
Then we can derive the following equivalence.
Proposition 2.6. The following are equivalent:
1. An extracting function Ext : X → M that enables us to extract, from
any cover-object x ∈ X , a secret s ∈M.
2. An |M|-partition4 (pointed) of X , indexed by elements ofM.
Proof. The surjectivity of Ext implies that5 X = unionsqs∈MExt−1({s}) and each
set Ext−1({s}) contains at least one element. Moreover, for any two diﬀerent
secrets s and s′, Ext−1({s})∩Ext−1({s′}) = ∅. Otherwise if y ∈ Ext−1({s})∩
Ext−1({s′}), then Ext(y) = s and Ext(y) = s′, which is impossible since Ext
is a function and s 6= s′.
Conversely, if we have an |M|-partition of X , indexed by elements ofM,
say {Xs | s ∈M}, then deﬁne an extracting function Ext : X →M such that
Ext(x) = s if x ∈ Xs.
If we have an extracting function, Ext : X → M (equivalently, an |M|-
partition of X ), then for any embedding function Emb we could choose, the
Relation 2.1.1 must hold for Ext and Emb to form a stego-scheme. An example
is given below.
Example 2.7. Let Ext be an extracting function and s ∈M be a secret. The
embedding function Emb randomly modiﬁes any element of X to an element
of Ext−1({s}).
4An M -partition of any set X is deﬁned for any integer M ≥ 1 as a partition of X
containing M subsets (not considering the empty set).
5unionsq is disjoint union.
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It is obvious by construction that (Emb,Ext;X ,M) is a stego-scheme since
Equation 2.1.1 holds. But random modiﬁcation does not guarantee that cover
and stego are close enough with respect to a distance d on X . With probability
1
|Ext−1({s})| , any cover x is modiﬁed to the most distant element of Ext
−1({s}),
i.e.
d(x, Emb(x, s)) = max
y∈Ext−1({s})
d(x,y).
Munuera (2012) said that any stego-scheme S = (Emb,Ext;X ,M) can be
reﬁned to give a better scheme with smaller embedding distortion and it can
be done by Algorithm 2.1.
Algorithm 2.1 Reﬁnement of the embedding function Emb.
1. Check if there are x,y ∈ X and s ∈ M such that Ext(y) = s and
d(x,y) < d(x, Emb(x, s)).
2. If such x,y, s exist, then deﬁne Emb′ such that{
Emb′(x, s) = y
Emb′(x′, s′) = Emb(x′, s′) for all (x, s) 6= (x′, s′).
Note that for all x ∈ X and s ∈M, Emb′ decreases embedding distortion:
d(x, Emb′(x, s)) ≤ d(x, Emb(x, s)). (2.2.1)
For ﬁxed extracting function Ext : X → M, let E be the set of all em-
bedding functions, Emb, such that (Emb,Ext;X ,M) is a stego-scheme. We
deﬁne on E the reﬁnement relation v, such that: Emb v Emb′ if and only if
Emb′ is deﬁned from Emb according to Algorithm 2. Therefore we have
Emb v Emb′ ⇒ d(x, Emb′(x, s)) ≤ d(x, Emb(x, s)). (2.2.2)
After ﬁnitely many consecutive (say N) reﬁnement steps of the embedding
function, Emb, we arrive at a point were any modiﬁcation is no longer an
improvement on the embedding distortion. Then denote the output of the
ﬁnal step as Emb∗. That is
Emb v Emb′ v · · · v Emb∗, (2.2.3)
and therefore we have
d(x, Emb∗(x, s)) ≤ d(x, Emb(x, s)) (2.2.4)
for all x ∈ X and s ∈ M. Actually, that is the best we can do to improve
embedding distortion. The stego-scheme S∗ = (Emb∗, Ext;X ,M) is proper
if and only if Algorithm 2.1 is no longer applicable. A deﬁnition of proper
embedding scheme is given as follows.
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Deﬁnition 2.8. (Munuera, 2012) Let S = (Emb,Ext;X ,M) be a stego-
scheme. Then S is proper if the embedding distortion is the minimum allowed
by Ext. That is for all x ∈ X , s ∈M and a distance d on X ,
d(x, Emb(x, s)) = d(x, Ext−1({s})) = min
y∈Ext−1({s})
d(x,y). (2.2.5)
Let us adopt the reﬁnement relation v on the stego-scheme itself, such that
(Emb,Ext;X ,M) v (Emb′, Ext;X ,M)⇔ Emb v Emb′.
Proposition 2.9. If S = (Emb,Ext;X ,M) v S∗ = (Emb∗, Ext;X ,M) and
if S and S∗ have embedding eﬃciencies e and e∗ respectively, then
e ≤ e∗.
Similarly, if the lower embedding eﬃciencies are respectively e and e∗ then
e ≤ e∗.
Proof. The proof of the proposition follows easily from Equation 2.2.4.
Since proper schemes have better parameters and any non-proper6 embed-
ding scheme can be modiﬁed to become proper according to Algorithm 2.1,
then from now on we consider only embedding functions that are proper. The
next section focuses on the construction to design this kind of scheme.
2.3 Construction of good schemes
This construction focuses not only on the embedding function but on the
extraction function as well. They both inﬂuence the quality of the stego-
scheme. Firstly, assume the extracting function, Ext : X → M, is arbitrary;
we construct a suitable embedding function Emb : X ×M → X such that
(Emb,Ext;X ,M) is proper.
2.3.1 Proper stego-schemes
For a given extracting function Ext, the best strategy to embed a secret s ∈M
inside a cover x ∈ X with minimum distortion (with respect to Ext) is to ﬁnd
the closest y ∈ Ext−1({s}) to the cover x ∈ X . That method is called the
Maximum-likelihood decoding problem in (Barbier, 2010).
Deﬁnition 2.10. (Barbier, 2010) Let C be a subset of X and x ∈ X . The
maximum-likelihood decoding ﬁnds an element y ∈ C closest to x. More
precisely, it ﬁnds y ∈ C, such that
d(x,y) = d(x, C) := min
c∈C
d(x, c). (2.3.1)
6A scheme is non-proper if Algorithm 2.1 is still applicable.
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We deﬁne the relation DecC : X ↔ C such that for all x ∈ X ,
DecC({x}) = {y ∈ C|d(x,y) = d(x, C)}. (2.3.2)
Proposition 2.11. If we deﬁne S = (Emb,Ext;X ,M) such that for all x ∈
X and s ∈M,
Emb(x, s) ∈ DecExt−1({s})({x}), (2.3.3)
then S is a proper stego-scheme.
Proof. Since Emb(x, s) ∈ Ext−1({s}), therefore Ext(Emb(x, s)) = s. That is
S is a stego-scheme. Moreover, Emb(x, s) ∈ DecExt−1({s})({x}), i.e.
d(x, Emb(x, s)) = d(x, Ext−1({s}))
and therefore S is proper by Deﬁnition 2.8.
Let Ext be an extracting function. The set {Xs|s ∈ M}, such that Xs =
Ext−1({s}), is an |M|-partition of X (see Proposition 2.6). So by Proposition
2.11, the stego-scheme (Emb,Ext;X ,M) such that for all x ∈ X and s ∈M,
Emb(x, s) ∈ DecXs(x), (2.3.4)
is a proper stego-scheme with respect to Ext. Therefore it has the maximum
embedding eﬃciency among all schemes7 (., Ext,X ,M) according to Proposi-
tion 2.9.
This method is then eﬃcient in terms of minimizing embedding distortion
for any cover and secret.
2.3.2 T -Covering
Here we impose a threshold T on the embedding distortion with respect to a
distance d on X .
Deﬁnition 2.12. (Galand and Kabatiansky, 2003a) An embedding scheme
with quality threshold T is a pair of functions, an embedding function Emb :
X ×M → X and an extracting function Ext : X → M, such that for any
x ∈ X and for any s ∈M, the stego-object y = Emb(x, s) ∈ X must satisfy
1. Ext(y) = x,
2. 8 d(x,y) ≤ T .
7(., Ext,X ,M) is the set of all stego-schemes that share the same extracting function
Ext.
8d(x,y) ≤ T means that the covering radius R = T .
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This deﬁnition means that for any cover x and any secret s, we can embed
s in x with embedding distortion not more than T . We can construct such a
scheme by using an |M|-partition of X with covering radius9 T .
Deﬁnition 2.13. Let M > 0 be an integer and PM = {Xi|i ∈ [1,M ]} be an
M-partition of X . Then we deﬁne the covering radius of PM to be the smallest
integer T such that10
d(x,Xi) ≤ T.
An M-partition of X with covering radius T is called an (M,T )-covering of X
or simply T -covering.
The following proposition shows how to use coverings of X to embed data.
Proposition 2.14. Let {Xs|s ∈ M} be an (|M|, T )-covering of X . Consider
the functions Ext : X → M and Emb : X ×M → X deﬁned by Ext(x) = s
if x ∈ Xs and Emb(x, s) ∈ DecXs(x). Then S = (Emb,Ext;X ,M) is a
stego-scheme with quality threshold T and it is proper.
Proof. Since Emb(x, s) ∈ DecXs , we have Ext(Emb(x, s)) = s. Furthermore,
d(x, Emb(x, s)) = d(x,Xs) ≤ T by deﬁnition of (|M|, T )-covering of X (see
Deﬁnition 2.13). By construction S is proper (see Proposition 2.11).
The converse also holds. We can deﬁne from a stego-scheme with quality
threshold T an (|M|, T )-covering of X , but that is not our issue. It is a new
problem in coding theory called Steganographic code by Zhang and Li (2005).
Proposition 2.15. The following are equivalent:
1. A proper stego-scheme S = (Emb,Ext;X ,M) with quality threshold T .
2. An (|M|, T )-covering of X .
Proof. From (|M|, T )-covering to stego-scheme, we use Proposition 2.14. Con-
versely, for all s ∈ M, the set P = {Ext−1({s})|s ∈ M} is an |M|-partition
of X and for all x ∈ X and s ∈M, d(x, Ext−1({s})) ≤ T .
2.4 Ordering stego-schemes
Let us deﬁne the space (S,4S) such that S is the set of all stego-schemes
deﬁned between X and M and the relation 4S is deﬁned such that: if S =
(Emb,Ext;X ,M),S ′ = (Emb′, Ext′;X ,M) ∈ S, then
S 4S S ′ ⇐⇒ R ≥ R′, (2.4.1)
9Covering radius is a term used in coding theory but we adopt it here to express our
problem clearly.
10Given a distance d on X , we deﬁne the distance between a subset C and an element x
of X to be d(x, C) = min
y∈C
d(x,y).
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where R and R′ are respectively the embedding radii of S and S ′, and it means
that S ′ is better than S. If we assume that any two schemes having the same
embedding radius are equivalent, then (S,4S) is a partially-ordered space.
There is a relationship between v (see Section 2.2) and 4S, and it is given
as follows.
Proposition 2.16. Let S = (Emb,Ext;X ,M) ∈ S be a non-proper stego-
scheme, and S ′ = (Emb′, Ext;X ,M) ∈ S such that Emb′ is a reﬁnement of
Emb. Then we have
S v S ′ =⇒ S 4S S ′.
Proof. If S v S ′, then for all x ∈ X and s ∈M,
d(x, Emb′(x, s)) ≤ d(x, Emb(x, s)).
By the deﬁnition of embedding radius (see Deﬁnition 2.3), R ≥ R′. Thus
S 4S S ′.
We deﬁne the set P of all |M|-partitions of X . Let 4P be a relation
deﬁned on P such that: if PX = {X1, . . . ,X|M|} is a ρ-covering11 of X and
P ′X = {X ′1, . . . ,X ′|M|} is a ρ′-covering of X , then
PX 4P P ′X ⇐⇒ ρ ≥ ρ′. (2.4.2)
Evidently, 4P is a pre-order. As usual it extends to a partial order on 4P-
equivalence classes.
Let τ deﬁne the transformation, from covering of X to stego-schemes, given
in Proposition 2.14. That is if PX = {Xs|s ∈ M} is a ρ-covering of X , then
deﬁne
τ(PX ) := (Emb,Ext;X ,M), (2.4.3)
such that Ext(x) = s if x ∈ Xs and Emb(x, s) ∈ DecXs(x).
Proposition 2.17. τ is isotone, i.e. if PX 4P P ′X , then τ(PX ) 4S τ(P ′X ).
Moreover, if PX is a ρ-covering of X (resp. P ′X is a ρ′-covering), then τ(PX )
has embedding radius R = ρ (resp. τ(P ′X ) has embedding radius R′ = ρ′).
Proof. Let PX = {Xs|s ∈ M} and P ′X = {X ′s|s ∈ M} and let ρ and ρ′ be
their covering radii respectively. If we assume that
τ(PX ) = (Emb,Ext;X ,M) = S,
τ(P ′X ) = (Emb′, Ext′;X ,M) = S ′
11Partition of X with covering radius ρ.
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and they respectively have embedding radii R and R′, then we have
PX 4P P ′X ⇐⇒ ρ ≥ ρ′






⇐⇒ R ≥ R′
⇐⇒ S 4S S ′.
A "good" stego-scheme S = (Emb,Ext;X ,M) ∈ S derives from an |M|-
partition of X with the smallest covering radius possible with respect to a
suitable distance d deﬁned on X . Moreover, there is no other stego-scheme
S ′ ∈ S such that S v S ′. That means, S is proper. An explicit example of a
scheme with the smallest embedding radius is given in Chapter 4, where covers
and secrets are represented by bit strings.
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Chapter 3
Application of coding theory to
steganography: Code-based
steganography
In this chapter we use sequences from an alphabet A to be the covers, called
cover-sequences (or -word or -text). The set of secrets is M. The resulting
stego is also a sequence from A with the same length as the cover, called
the stego-sequence (or -word or -text). The distortion is then the number of
changes introduced by the embedding function in the cover. That number of
changes is captured by the Hamming distance (See Deﬁnition 3.6) between
the two equi-length sequences: the cover and the stego-sequence. We consider
Hamming distance because it is the metric used in coding theory. Since we
are linking the two areas, it is fundamentally relevant.
Let the alphabet A = {a1, a1, . . . , aq}. For example, in steganography
using 8-bit gray-scale digital images, A is the set of all integers in the range
of [0, 256). If we deﬁne a code as just a subset of An, then the construction
in the previous chapter needs to handle |M| diﬀerent codes, each with their
cardinality and with its own decoding strategy. It would be easier if the subsets
that partition the space An were related to each other in such a way that all
of them can be deduced from only one, say C ⊆ An, and if all of the decoding
rules could be deduced from the decoding of C.
This chapter concentrates on that method of construction. We assume
that the set A is a group and then if C is a proper subgroup of An, then
the partition set (extracting function) is the quotient space An/C and the
embedding function maps any (x, s) ∈ An × M to an element in a coset
of An/C which is the inverse image of s by the extracting function. So the
partitions that were central to the previous chapter appear in this chapter as
the elements - cosets - of a quotient group.
15
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3.1 Brief introduction to coding theory
Codes are used to correct errors introduced by transmission through a noisy
channel. However, steganographic embedding schemes can be thought to in-
troduce error in order to communicate a secret. The problem in coding theory
is to ﬁnd a code that can correct as much error as possible. However, the
steganographic problem is to ﬁnd a scheme that introduces small error. So we
have interestingly divergent goals.
3.1.1 Basic deﬁnitions
We now proceed to the basic notions in coding theory.
Deﬁnition 3.1. Let A = {a1, . . . , aq} be an alphabet, whose elements are called
symbols. A block code (or simply code) C of length n over A is a subset of
An. A sequence c ∈ C is called a codeword. The number of elements of C is
called the size of C.
A code of length n and size K is called an (n,K)-code.
Codes for which A = B are called binary codes. In general if |A| = q, then
we refer to a q-ary code.
Deﬁnition 3.2. If A is a group under the group operation ?, then a group
code, C, is a subgroup of the direct product group An under the componentwise
group operation ? such that for all x = (x1, . . . , xn),y = (y1, . . . , yn) : An,
x ? y := (x1 ? y1, . . . , xn ? yn).
Example 3.3. Let A = B and n = 5. Then the code c = {c0, c1, c2, c3} ⊂ B5
such that
c0 = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0), c1 = (1, 1, 1, 0, 0), c2 = (0, 1, 1, 1, 1), c3 = (1, 0, 0, 1, 1)
is a (5, 4)-binary code. Moreover, Table 3.1 shows that it is a group code with
the XOR operation on B.
Table 3.1: Table of XOR on C
⊕ (0, 0, 0, 0, 0) (1, 1, 1, 0, 0) (0, 1, 1, 1, 1) (1, 0, 0, 1, 1)
(0, 0, 0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0, 0, 0) (1, 1, 1, 0, 0) (0, 1, 1, 1, 1) (1, 0, 0, 1, 1)
(1, 1, 1, 0, 0) (1, 1, 1, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0, 0, 0) (1, 0, 0, 1, 1) (0, 1, 1, 1, 1)
(0, 1, 1, 1, 1) (0, 1, 1, 1, 1) (1, 0, 0, 1, 1) (0, 0, 0, 0, 0) (1, 1, 1, 0, 0)
(1, 0, 0, 1, 1) (1, 0, 0, 1, 1) (0, 1, 1, 1, 1) (1, 1, 1, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
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The rate of a code measure its transmission capacity, hence its eﬃciency.












The number of errors incurred in transmission is given by the Hamming dis-
tance between the transmitted and received words. The errors are the changes
caused by the embedding process. Hamming distance is deﬁned between two
sequences of the same length to be the number of diﬀerences between them.
It actually sums the per-symbol distance between the two sequences.
Deﬁnition 3.6. Let x = (x1, . . . , xn) and y = (y1, . . . , yn). Then for every
i ∈ [1, n] deﬁne






Deﬁnition 3.7. The Hamming weight wH(x), of a word x = (x1, . . . , xn) is
the number of its non zero coordinates and it is deﬁned as




For a ﬁxed length n, the Hamming distance is a metric on the vector space
of words of that length.
Proposition 3.8. For every x,y, z ∈ An, dH satisﬁes the following
1. 0 ≤ dH(x,y) ≤ n (non-negative and bounded)
2. dH(x,y) = 0 if and only if x = y (identity of indiscernibles)
3. dH(x,y) = dH(y,x) (symmetry)
4. dH(x, z) ≤ dH(x,y) + dH(y, z) (triangular inequality)
Proof.
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δ(xi, yi) ≤ n.
2. Two sequences of the same length are equal if and only if all coordinates
are the same:
dH(x,y) = 0 ⇐⇒ ∀i ∈ [1, n], δ(xi, yi) = 0
⇐⇒ x = y.
3. By deﬁnition, for all i ∈ [1, n], δ(xi, yi) = δ(yi, xi). Extending to dH , we
have
dH(x,y) = dH(y,x).
4. If we set V (x, z) := {i ∈ [1, n] |xi 6= zi}, then dH(x, z) = |V (x, z)|. For
y ∈ An,
V (x, z) ⊆ V (x,y) ∪ V (y, z).
Therefore we have
dH(x, z) = |V (x, z)| ≤ |V (x,y)|+ |V (y, z)| = dH(x,y) + dH(y, z).
The following is an interesting property of Hamming distance on commu-
tative groups.
Lemma 3.9. Let (A, ?) be a ﬁnite Abelian group. Then the Hamming distance
in An is translation invariant under ?, that is for all x,y, z ∈ An
dH(x,y) = dH(x ? z,y ? z). (3.1.5)
Moreover, for any subset C ⊆ An,
1dH(x, z ? C) = dH(x ? z−1, C).
Proof. For x,y, z : An, we have
dH(x,y) := |{i |xi 6= yi}|
and
dH(x ? z,y ? z) := |{i |xi ? zi 6= yi ? zi}|.
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The equality dH(x,y) = dH(x ? z,y ? z) holds since xi 6= yi ≡ xi ? zi 6= yi ? zi
for all i ∈ [1, n].
If C ⊆ An, then
dH(x, z ? C) := min
c∈C








−1, c) by commutativity
= dH(x ? z
−1, c).
In terms of error correction, a good code can correct more error if the
codewords are further apart (see Theorem 3.13). That means the distance
between any two codewords must be as great as some constant d ∈ [1, n], and
that constant is called the distance of the code.
Deﬁnition 3.10. The minimum distance (or distance) of a code C is the
minimum between any two codewords of C:
dH(C) := min {dH(c1, c2) | c1, c2 ∈ C, c1 6= c2}. (3.1.6)
A (n,K)−code with minimum distance d is called a (n,K, d)-code.
Example 3.11. The minimum distance of the (5, 4)-code C in given in Exam-
ple 3.1 is dH(C) = 3 as shown in Table 3.2. Hence C is a (5, 4, 3)-code.
Table 3.2: Distance between codewords of C
dH (0, 0, 0, 0, 0) (1, 1, 1, 0, 0) (0, 1, 1, 1, 1) (1, 0, 0, 1, 1)
(0, 0, 0, 0, 0) - 3 4 3
(1, 1, 1, 0, 0) 3 - 3 4
(0, 1, 1, 1, 1) 4 3 - 3
(1, 0, 0, 1, 1) 3 4 3 -
We now show a connection between the distance of a code and the possi-
bility of detecting and correcting errors.
Deﬁnition 3.12. Let C be a code of length n over the alphabet A.
1. C an r-error detector2 if for every codeword c ∈ C and every x ∈ An
with x 6= c, if dH(x, c) ≤ r then x /∈ C.
2r-error detector means can detect r errors.
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2. C a t-error corrector3 if for every x ∈ An, if there exists c ∈ C such that
dH(x, c) ≤ t then c is the unique closest codeword to x, i.e.
dH(x, c) = dH(x, C)
and for any codeword c′ 6= c,
dH(x, c
′) > dH(x, C).
The following theorem recasts that deﬁnition in terms of the minimum
distance of the code.
Theorem 3.13. Let C be a code of length n over the alphabet A.
1. C is an r-error detector if and only if dH(C) > r.
2. C is a t-error corrector if and only if dH(C) ≥ 2t+ 1.
Proof. 1. Let C ⊆ An be a code that can detect r errors. Then by Deﬁnition
3.12, for all c ∈ C and x ∈ An, x 6= c
x ∈ C =⇒ dH(x, C) > r.
Conversely, if dH(C) > r, then for all c, c′ ∈ C, c 6= c′, dH(c, c′) > r.
Thus if dH(c,x) ≤ r, then x /∈ C.
2. Suppose that C can correct up to t errors. Then by Deﬁnition 3.12
dH(x, c) ≤ t =⇒ dH(x, c) = dH(x, C).
Conversely, if dH(C) ≥ 2t+ 1, then spheres of radius t around codewords
of C do not overlap. If x is in a sphere of radius t ≤ 1
2
(d − 1) around a
codeword c (dH(x, c) ≤ t), then c is the only codeword that satisfy
dH(x, c) = dH(x, C).
If c′ is another codeword such that
dH(x, c
′) = dH(x, C),
then dH(x, c
′) > t. Otherwise by the triangular inequality and dH(c, c′) ≥
dH(C),
dH(c, c
′) ≤ dH(C,x) + dH(x, c′) ≤ 2t ≤ dH(C)− 1 (contradiction).
3r-error corrector means can correct up to r errors.
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Example 3.14. Continuing Example 3.1, Table 3.2 shows that dH(C) = 3,
therefore C detects 2 errors but can only correct 1.
The aim of coding theory is to construct a code with a rate as close to 1 as
possible and with as large a distance as possible. In other words, a good code
has small n, large K and large d. If a code C ⊆ An can correct up to t errors,
then C is called a t-error correcting code. If |A| = q, then C is a q-ary t-error
correcting code.
We now give an upper bound limiting the maximum possible size of any
code. The bound reﬂects that if C is a t-error correcting code, then if we place
spheres of radius t around every codeword, the spheres must not overlap.
Theorem 3.15. (Sphere-packing bound) (MacWilliams and Sloane, 1977) A
t-error correcting code C of length n and cardinality K over an alphabet A with
q > 1 elements must satisfy
KVq(t, n) ≤ qn. (3.1.7)
Proof. Let C be a q-ary t-error correcting code of length n and cardinality
K. Then any two spheres of radius t around distinct codewords are disjoint
and there are K of them. Each of the K spheres contains Vq(t, n) elements
according to Lemma 3.20. All elements of An are not necessarily in the union
of the K spheres. Therefore the cardinality of the union of the spheres around
codewords of C must be less than or equal to qn.
There are codes that achieve the sphere-packing bound.
Deﬁnition 3.16. An (n,K, t)-error correcting code C over an alphabet of size
q is perfect if it satisﬁes the sphere-packing bound with equality.
KVq(t, n) = q
n. (3.1.8)
Other parameters we can consider in this context are the average distance
to code and the covering radius. Their deﬁnitions are given below.








Deﬁnition 3.18. The covering radius of a code C ⊆ An is the smallest integer
ρ such that the union of the spheres of radius ρ around the codewords of C cover
the whole space An. Thus
ρ := min{d |Aq ⊆ ∪c∈C4B(c, d)}. (3.1.10)
4B(c, d) denotes the sphere of radius d around c.
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Thus every x ∈ An is at a distance at most ρ from a codeword of C. That is
ρ = max
x∈An
dH(x, C) ≤ n. (3.1.11)
An (n,K)-code with covering radius ρ is called a (n,K, ρ)-covering code5.
Deﬁnition 3.19. Let A be an alphabet of size q with q > 1. Then for every
x ∈ An and every r ∈ N, a sphere with center x and radius r, denoted B(x, r),
is deﬁned to be the set
{y ∈ An | dH(x,y) ≤ r}.
The volume of a sphere B(x, r) is denoted by Vq(n, r).
Lemma 3.20. For every natural number r ≥ 0 and alphabet A of size q > 1,








(q − 1)i. (3.1.12)
elements if r ≤ n.
Proof. Let x ∈ An. The number of vectors y at distance exactly i, 0 ≤ i ≤ n,
is equal to the number of ways to choose i positions in x to be changed and
there are q − 1 ways of changing each of these positions. Hence, the number





(q − 1)i. Since a sphere of radius
r around x contains all vectors whose distance from x is in the range 0 to r,




















Observe that if r > n, then all vectors in the space are within distance r
and so the sphere B(x, r) contains the entire space, hence Vq(n, r) = q
n. The
following theorem gives a lower bound on the number of codewords of a code
C with covering radius ρ (ρ-covering code), 0 ≤ ρ ≤ n.
Theorem 3.21. (Sphere-covering bound) A (n,K, ρ)-covering code over an





5We use covering code when we want to specify that the third parameter is the covering
radius.
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Proof. Let C ⊆ An be a (n,K, ρ)-covering code, n, ρ ∈ N and 0 ≤ ρ ≤ n. Then
for all c ∈ C, the sphere of radius ρ around c contains Vq(n, ρ) elements, by
Lemma 3.20. By Deﬁnition 3.18 of covering radius, we have






Since |C| = K and for all c ∈ C, |B(c, ρ)| = Vq(n, ρ) by Lemma 3.20, then we
have
qn ≤ KVq(n, ρ).
The equality in Equation 3.20 holds when any two distinct spheres of radius
ρ around distinct codewords are disjoint. Perfect codes achieve the sphere-
covering bound.
Lemma 3.22. A t-error correcting code C is perfect if and only if its covering
radius is ρ = t. That is, C can correct errors up to its covering radius.
Proof. If ρ = t then both Equation (3.1.7) and Equation (3.1.13) hold. There-
fore
KVq(n, t) = q
n.
Conversely, if we assume that C is perfect, then t is the smallest integer such
that the union of the spheres of radius t around the codewords of C cover the
whole space An, which is exactly the meaning of covering radius. Therefore
ρ = t.
Example 3.23. The code C in Example 3.1 is a (5, 4, 2)−covering code with
minimum distance 3 (or (5, 4, 3)-code) over B and it has average distance RC =
9/8. Every x ∈ B5 belongs to at least one sphere of radius 2 around the
codewords of C. The spheres are not pairwise disjoint because for example
(1, 0, 1, 0, 1) ∈ B(c1, 2) ∩B(c3, 2).
C is not perfect.
3.1.2 Decoding
Let us consider A as an Abelian group with identity element6 0, and the
all zero vector, denoted by 0, the identity element for An. For a code7 C,
if x ∈ An is received, then decoding x means ﬁnding a closest c ∈ C. It is
6The group operation is in general addition. That is why we use 0.
7Here codes refers to group codes, i.e. subgroup of An (see Deﬁnition 3.2).
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possible that there is more than one closest codeword. So decoding is a relation
Dec : An ↔ C which relates every x ∈ An to each of its closest codewords.
We denote DecC(x) the set of all closest codewords to x.
So we formally deﬁne decoding as a minimum distance decoding.
Deﬁnition 3.24. Let C be a code of length n over an alphabet A. The mini-
mum distance decoding rule states that every x ∈ An is decoded to cx ∈ C that
is closest to x:
DecC(x) = {cx ∈ C | dH(x, cx) = dH(x, C)}. (3.1.14)
A brute force algorithm for minimum distance decoding is given in Algo-
rithm 3.1.
Algorithm 3.1 Minimum distance decoding algorithm (MDD)
1. Read the received vector x ∈ An and the code C.
2. Compute dH(x, c) for all c ∈ C.
3. MDD decode x to cx that is a closet codeword.
Eﬃciency of MDD: The sphere packing bound says that there are at most8
qn
qt
codewords in C, so the worst case running time for Step 1 and Step 2 is of
O(nqn−t). Therefore the worst case running time is of O(nqn−t).
Example 3.25. If the vector x = (0, 1, 0, 1, 1) is received, DecC(x) = {(0, 1, 1, 1, 1)}
(See Example3.1) because (0, 1, 0, 1, 1) ∈ B(c2, 1). But if the vector x′ =
(1, 0, 1, 0, 1) is received then we can't correct x since for any c ∈ C,x /∈ B(C, 1).
N can't decide between c1 and c3 which one is the correct sent codeword because
dH(x
′, C) = 2 = dH(x′, c1) = dH(x′, c3).
Decoding means deciding from a received x which codeword c was trans-
mitted. But one can never be certain about c. So a strategy is to ﬁnd the
most likely codeword c, given that x is received. This strategy is called the
maximum likelihood decoding.
Deﬁnition 3.26. Let C be a code of length n over an alphabet A. The max-
imum likelihood decoding rule states that every x ∈ An is decoded to cx ∈ C
when
Pr[x received | cx was sent] = max
c∈C
Pr[x received | c was sent]. (3.1.15)
8Assuming that C is t-error correcting code and t is already known.
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We assume that a codeword c = (c1, . . . , cn) ∈ C is transmitted. The
number of errors in a received word x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ An is equivalent to the
distance (Hamming) between c and x, where we deﬁne error as follows.
Deﬁnition 3.27. The error vector is a vector e = (e1, . . . , en) such that for
all i ∈ [1, n]
xi = ci ? ei, (3.1.16)
or in other words,
ei = xi ? c
−1
i . (3.1.17)
If a codeword c was transmitted without error, i.e. e = 0, then the received
vector x = c ? 0 = c is correct.
Proposition 3.28. Let C be a code, and a codeword c ∈ C was sent. Then the
received vector x is correct if and only if dH(x, c) = 0.
Proof. The received vector x is correct if and only if each symbol is correct,
i.e. for all i ∈ [1, n],
ei = 0 ⇐⇒ xi ? c−1i = 0
⇐⇒ xi = ci.
By Proposition 3.8, dH(x, C) = 0.
Maximum likelihood decoding (Deﬁnition 3.26) ﬁnds the most likely error
vector e, given that x is received. Then decode x as c = x?e−1. If we assign to
each symbol of x a probability of being correct or not: 1− p is the probability
of xi being correct (i.e. ei = 0), where in general 0 ≤ p < 12 (MacWilliams and
Sloane, 1977), then we can deduce the following.
Proposition 3.29. If the received vector x ∈ An is not a codeword of C, then
the error vector e is a non zero vector of minimum weight in An such that
x ? e−1 ∈ C.
Proof. Assume that error occurs with probability p independently at each sym-
bol. That is for each i ∈ [1, n],
Pr[ei 6= 0] = p.
If u ∈ An is a vector of weight a, then by independence
Pr[e = u] = pa(1− p)n−a.
Since p < 1/2, the function f(a) = pa(1−p)n−a decreases with a ∈ [1, n]. That
is, the most likely error vector is of minimum weight.
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Algorithm 3.2 Maximum Likelihood Decoding Algorithm (MLD)
1. Read the received vector x ∈ An and the code C.
2. Find all vectors u such that x ? u−1 ∈ C (Non empty since x there).
3. In the set of all such u, ﬁnd one with smallest weight, and denote it e.
4. MLD decode x to c = x ? e−1.
The maximum likelihood decoding algorithm ﬁnds the minimum weight
vector that satisﬁes x ? e−1 ∈ C and then decodes x as c = x ? e−1.
Eﬃciency of MLD: Step1 is similar to MDD. For Step 2 we can ﬁnd all the
u's by computing x ? C and that taking9 O(nqn−t). Time for computing the
weight and ﬁnding the smallest doesn't exceed O(nqn−t). Therefore the worst
case running time is of O(nqn−t), similar to MDD.
We can improve Algorithm 3.2 by using the following lemma.
Lemma 3.30. For a (n,M, ρ)-covering code C ⊆ An, the Hamming weight of
an error vector is at most R.
Proof. The sphere-covering bound (3.21) tells us that for every received vector
x ∈ An there exists c ∈ C such that x ∈ B(c, ρ). Moreover
dH(x, c) = dH(x ? c
−1, 0)
= wH(x ? c
−1)
≤ ρ.
We assume that the covering radius of C is known10.
Algorithm 3.3 Maximum Likelihood Decoding Algorithm (MLDI) improved
1. Read the received vector x ∈ An and the code C.
2. Find all vectors u such that wH(u) ≤ ρ and x ? u−1 ∈ C.
3. In the set of all such u, ﬁnd the one with smallest weight, and denote
it e.
4. MLD decode x to c = x ? e−1.
9Running time is for the worst case.
10There should be algorithms to compute covering radius but here we assume it is known.
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Eﬃciency of MLDI: For Step 2 we compute x?C and look in the set u with
weight less than ρ the smallest weight. So running time for Step 3 is smaller
but it still takes O(nqn) time to run MLDI.
Now the decoding procedure is clear for a code C. The next step consists
of looking for a decoding map for the cosets of C that are in An/C.
3.1.3 Quotient space and cosets
Deﬁnition 3.31. For a group code C ⊆ An. For each z ∈ An, the set
z ? C := {z ? c | c ∈ C}
is called a coset of C. We deﬁne quotient space
An/C := {z ? C | z ∈ An}.
A vector of minimum Hamming weight in a coset is called its leader. It is
possible that there are more than one vector of minimum weight in a coset, but
choose one of them at random and call it the coset leader.
The following proposition is given without proof, since it is basic group
theory.
Proposition 3.32. For any code11 C ⊂ An, the following hold.
1. Each coset of C has cardinality equal to C.
2. z is in the coset z ? C for any z ∈ An.
3. For x,y ∈ An, x ? C = y ? C if and only if x ? y−1 ∈ C.
4. For any z ∈ An we have z ? C = C if and only if z ∈ C.
5. Two cosets are either disjoint or coincide, i.e. if x,y ∈ An, then either
x ? C = y ? C or (x ? C) ∩ (y ? C) = ∅.
Note that if |A| = q, the quotient group contains qn/|C| distinct cosets.
Moreover if C is a (n,K, ρ)-covering code, then An/C is a (qn/K, ρ)-covering
of An (see Chapter 2).
As in Example 3.33, the last two cosets in Table 3.3 have two minimum
weight vectors and the others have exactly one. We denote by ΩC the set of
all coset leaders of C.
Now back to decoding. Suppose a vector x ∈ An is received. Then x must
belong to a coset of C, say x = z ? C (z ∈ An, c ∈ C). If the codeword c′ was
sent, then the actual error vector e = x ? c′−1 = z ? C ? c′−1 = z ? c′′ ∈ z ? C
11C is normal because it is a subgroup of a commutative group.
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since C is a group code. Therefore the possible error vectors are in the coset
containing x.
MacWilliams and Sloane (1977) give a method of decoding by building the
standard array table which consists of: the ﬁrst row consists of the code itself,
with the zero codeword on the left and the other rows being the other cosets
z?C, z ∈ ΩC, arranged in the same order and with the coset leader on the left.
Example 3.33. Let C be the code in Example 3.1. Then the standard array
table of C is given in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: A standard array for C
C ⊕ (0, 0, 0, 0, 0) : (0,0,0,0,0) (1, 1, 1, 0, 0) (0, 1, 1, 1, 1) (1, 0, 0, 1, 1)
C ⊕ (0, 0, 0, 0, 1) : (0,0,0,0,1) (1, 1, 1, 0, 1) (0, 1, 1, 1, 0) (1, 0, 0, 1, 0)
C ⊕ (0, 0, 0, 1, 0) : (0,0,0,1,0) (1, 1, 1, 1, 0) (0, 1, 1, 0, 1) (1, 0, 0, 0, 1)
C ⊕ (0, 0, 1, 0, 0) : (0,0,1,0,0) (1, 1, 0, 0, 0) (0, 1, 0, 1, 1) (1, 0, 1, 1, 1)
C ⊕ (0, 1, 0, 0, 0) : (0,1,0,0,0) (1, 0, 1, 0, 0) (0, 0, 1, 1, 1) (1, 1, 0, 1, 1)
C ⊕ (1, 0, 0, 0, 0) : (1,0,0,0,0) (0, 1, 1, 0, 0) (1, 1, 1, 1, 1) (0, 0, 0, 1, 1)
C ⊕ (0, 0, 1, 0, 1) : (0,0,1,0,1) (1, 1, 0, 0, 1) (0,1,0,1,0) (1, 0, 1, 1, 0)
C ⊕ (0, 0, 1, 1, 0) : (0,0,1,1,0) (1, 1, 0, 1, 0) (0,1,0,0,1) (1, 0, 1, 0, 1)
We assume that the standard array is already given. The decoding using the
standard array is called standard array decoding and it is given in Algorithm
3.4.
Algorithm 3.4 Standard array decoding (SAD)
1. Read the received vector x ∈ An.
2. Find the row of x in the standard array table.
3. Choose the error vector e as the coset leader found at the extreme left
of x.
4. SAD decode x to c = x ? e−1.
Eﬃciency of SAD: The time to ﬁnd the row of x dominates the running
time of SAD, and at most if is of O(qn).
Example 3.34. If we receive the vector x = (1, 1, 1, 1, 0), then by looking
at the SA table in Example 3.33, the decoder decides that the error vector is
e = (0, 0, 0, 1, 0) and then decodes x to DecC(x) = x⊕ e = (1, 1, 1, 0, 0) = c1.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 3. CODE-BASED STEGANOGRAPHY 29
If a t-error correcting code C is perfect, then spheres of radius t around
codewords do not overlap and cover the whole space An. Therefore C can
correct errors up to the covering radius ρ = t. Therefore DecC is a single
function, and it maps each x ∈ An to cx such that x ∈ B(cx, t). That means
that the error vector e = x ? C−1x is unique (there is no other e′ = x ? C−1 such
that wH(e) = wH(e
′)). Thus the coset leaders of C are the unique vector of
minimum weight in its coset. And by Lemma 3.30, if z ∈ ΩC then wH(z) ≤ t.
3.2 Stego-schemes from codes
In general codes are deﬁned over the ﬁeld Fq (q is a prime power) which, with
the addition modulo q, is an Abelian group. Then we are ﬁrst going to ﬁnd
the decoding map of the cosets of An/C, where A is an Abelian group and C
is a group code deﬁned over A.
Let A be an Abelian group, C ⊆ An be a group code (see Section 3.1.3)
and DecC be decoding relation for C. Then the following proposition gives the
rules of decoding for the cosets of C.
Proposition 3.35. (Munuera, 2012) Let A be an Abelian group, C ⊆ An a
group code and z ∈ An. If DecC is a decoding for C, then a decoding for the
coset z ? C relates any x ∈ An to
Decz?C(x) = {z ? c | c = DecC(z−1 ? x)}.
Proof. It is well deﬁned since z ? DecC(x ? z−1) ∈ z ? C.
Now assume that there exists y ∈ z ? C such that
dH(x,y) < dH(x, z ? DecC(z−1 ? x)).
By Lemma 3.9, we have
dH(z
−1 ? x, z−1 ? y) < dH(z−1 ? x, DecC(z−1 ? x)). (3.2.1)
Since z−1 ?y ∈ C, therefore the Inequality (3.2.1) contradicts the the deﬁnition
DecC, as minimum distance decoding.
In order to deﬁne the embedding scheme, we need to describe the partition
set index byM. That is we need a group code C ⊆ An of cardinality qn|M| . So
|An/C| = |M|. Then we can deﬁne a one to one mapping φ : An/C →M. Let
ΩC = {0, z1, z2, . . . , z|M|} be the set of coset leaders of C. Then we have
An/C = {z1 ? C, z2 ? C, . . . , z|M| ? C} (3.2.2)
= {[z1], [z2], . . . , [z|M|]}. (3.2.3)
Then equivalently φ : ΩC →M where ΩC is the set of all coset leaders of
C and each coset can be represented by its coset leader. If pi : An → An/C
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is the canonical projection map, then the extracting function is Ext = pi ◦ φ.
Therefore for every s ∈ M, we have Cs = φ−1(s) ? C. The embedding s maps
any cover x to an element of DecCs . The scheme (Emb,Ext;An,M) is a called
code-based stego-scheme and it is proper.
Algorithm 3.5 describes the embedding and extracting from a code C which
is a group code of length n on A. The functions φ, pi are as described above,
the cover-sequence is from An and the secret to embedded is fromM.
Algorithm 3.5 Embedding scheme from a code C (CBE).
1. Given the code C, the cover x ∈ An and the secret s ∈M.
2. Embedding: Modify the cover so that y = φ−1(s) ? DecC((φ−1(s))−1 ?
x).
3. Extraction: The secret is extracted such that s = pi ◦ φ(y).
Eﬃciency of CBE: Embedding depends entirely on the decoding algorithm
we choose for the code C. So they takes equivalently the same amount of time.
To deﬁne a stego-scheme based on coding theory, we need a code and an
eﬃcient decoding algorithm on the code, such that its complexity is at most
polynomial time.
3.3 Bounds on the parameters of code based
stego-scheme
Some bounds on the parameters of code-steganographic schemes are given in
this section. Those bounds are mostly derived from coding theoretic bounds.
The following proposition is the analogue of the Hamming bound in steganog-
raphy. It says that the set of possible secrets that can be embedded is at most
as great as the volume Vq(n,R) of the sphere of radius R in Aq such that R is
the embedding radius of the stego-scheme.
Proposition 3.36. A (n,M,R)-embedding scheme12 S = (Emb,Ext;X ,M)
on A satisﬁes
M ≤ Vq(n,R). (3.3.1)
Proof. Let x ∈ An. For any s ∈M, we have Emb(x, s) ∈ B(x, R) by deﬁnition
of embedding radius. By Proposition 2.5 in Chapter 2, for ﬁxed x ∈ An, the
map Emb(x, .) :M→ B(x, R) is injective. Therefore |M| ≤ Vq(n,R).
12R is here the embedding radius, and M = |M|.
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Schemes that achieve the bound (3.36) are called maximum length embed-
dable code (Zhang and Li, 2005) or perfect (Munuera, 2012).
Theorem 3.37. If C is a (n,K, t)-error correcting13 (0 ≤ t ≤ n) perfect code




Proof. Let C be a t-error correcting perfect code of length n containing K
codewords. Then the covering radius of C is ρ = t, which is the embedding
radius of C. That is R = ρ = t. Then C achieve the sphere covering bound
(3.1.13), i.e.
qn = KVq(n, t) = KVq(n, ρ) = KVq(n,R)
Therefore S is perfect. The other parameters follows easily from the construc-
tion in Section 3.2.
The relative payload or capacity is another important parameter of stego-
schemes and it is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 3.38. The relative payload of a stego-scheme, denoted by α, is the
number of embedded bits conveyed per single cover symbol. It is given by the





where h = log2 |M| is the embedding capacity deﬁned in Chapter 2.
There is an obvious upper bound we can derive on the relative payload.
Proposition 3.39. For a stego-scheme (Emb,Ext;An,M) such that |A| = q,
α ≤ log2 q. (3.3.3)
Proof. Since the extracting function Ext : An →M is surjective by deﬁnition,
then we have |M| ≤ qn. Thus log2 |M|
n
≤ log2 q.
A good scheme should have large α and e.
Lemma 3.40. Let q > 1, n, be two integers and 0 < ρ ≤ n− n/q. Then
Vq(n, ρ) ≤ qnHq(
ρ
n), (3.3.4)
where Hq is the q-ary entropy function deﬁned by
Hq(p) = p logq(q − 1)− p logq(p)− (1− p) logq(1− p). (3.3.5)
13t-error correcting perfect codes are t-covering code (see Lemma 3.22).
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The ﬁrst inequality comes from the fact that ρ ≤ n− n/q and hence
ρ
n




The second inequality is because ρ ≤ n.
From that lemma we can derive an upper bound on the embedding capacity.
Theorem 3.41. The embedding capacity h of a q-ary14 code-based stego-scheme







Proof. The proof of this theorem follows easily from the previous Lemma 3.40:
h = log2 |M| by deﬁnition
≤ log2 Vq(n, ρ) by Prop. 3.36





log2 q by Lemma 3.40.
14q-ary stego-schemes refers to stego-schemes deﬁned on A such that |A| = q.
15We use R = ρ for the embedding radius since our stego-scheme are based on a code of
covering radius ρ. By Chapter 2, embedding radius and covering radius coincide.
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Form Theorem 3.41, we can derive a bound on the relative capacity.
Corollary 3.42. Let S = (Emb,Ext;An,M) be a q-ary stego-scheme with






Proof. The proof follow easily from Theorem 3.41 and Deﬁnition 3.38 of rela-
tive payload.
The following is an upper bound on the embedding eﬃciency.
Corollary 3.43. (Fridrich et al., 2007a) If S = (Emb,Ext;An,M) be a
q-ary stego-scheme with relative message length α, then the following upper







Proof. We have e := h
ρ
















where H−1q is the inverse function of the Hq (see Appendix ??). Therefore,







We compare schemes having the same relative payload by their embed-
ding eﬃciencies. So scheme that achieve (if possible) or at least as close as
the bound (3.43) is preferable. Fridrich et al. (2007a) state that there ex-
ist stego-schemes based on linear codes whose lower embedding eﬃciency is
asymptotically optimal, i.e. achieve the upper bound (3.43).
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Chapter 4
Steganographic Scheme from
linear codes: Matrix embedding
In this chapter we connect the previous two chapters. In particular we spe-
cialise the theory of Chapter 3 to "linear" codes to show that some bounds in
Chapter 3 can be achieved by random linear codes. We also establish that the
result is best possible. A linear code enables us to encrypt and decrypt by a
linear transformation and hence by multiplying by a matrix.
A particular case of a code-based stego-scheme arising from linear codes
is called matrix embedding. It was ﬁrst introduced by Crandall (1998). It
requires the sender and recipient to agree in advance on a parity check matrix
H, and then the secret is extracted by the recipient as the syndrome with
respect to H of the received cover object. This method is popular because of
the F5 algorithm of (Westfeld, 2001), which can embed t bits of message in
2t− 1 cover symbols by changing at most one of them. The F5 algorithm is a
speciﬁc implementation of matrix encoding by using Hamming codes. That is
why we can directly explain the parameters above, since Hamming codes are
of length 2t − 1, redundancy t and covering radius 1.
4.1 Linear codes
This section recalls several notions on linear codes.
Deﬁnition 4.1. A [n, k]q linear code C is a k-dimensional subspace of an
n-dimensional vector space over a ﬁnite ﬁeld Fq (q a prime power).
A [n, k]q linear code C can be represented as the null space of a matrix1 H ∈
(Fq)(n−k)×n. Such a matrix is called a parity check matrix of C (MacWilliams
and Sloane, 1977).
There are several consequences of a code being linear. Let H be a parity
check matrix of a linear code C:
1We denote by (Fq)(n−k)×n the set of all (n− k)× n matrices on Fq.
34
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1. If x and y are codewords of C, then so is2 x+ y, because
(x+ y)Htr = xHtr + yHtr = 0.
2. If c ∈ Fq, then cx is also a codeword, because (cx)Htr = c(xHtr) = 0.
Moreover, a linear code forms an additive group and a vector space over the
ﬁeld Fq. Hence linear codes over Fq are group codes3.
To ﬁnd the minimum distance for a general code we have to look at all
pairs of codewords. But for linear codes there's a short-cut.
Proposition 4.2. The minimum distance of a linear code is equal to the min-
imum weight of its non zero codewords.
Proof. Suppose two distinct codewords c, c′ ∈ C such that dH(c, c′) = d. Then
we have wH(c− c′) = d. c− c′ is a codeword of C because
(c− c′)Htr = cHtr − c′Htr = 0
Conversely, if c 6= 0 is a codeword such that wH(c) = d, then the minimum
distance of C is at most d, since 0 ∈ C and dH(c,0) = wH(c).
An [n, k]q linear code C with minimum distance (or weight) d is called an
[n, k, d]q-code
4.
Example 4.3. A parity check matrix for C (in Example 3.1) is given by
H =
0 0 0 1 11 0 1 0 1
1 1 0 1 0
 .
It easy to see that C is the null space of H. In addition, the code C is a binary
linear [5, 2, 3]-code, where 5 is the length, 2 the dimension and 3 the distance.
4.2 Matrix embedding theorem
To deﬁne a matrix embedding scheme we need a linear code C, and a decoding
algorithm on C. We follow the concepts of Chapter 3. As partition of Fnq
we consider the quotient space Fnq /C such that C is an [n, k] linear code over
Fq. The elements of the quotient space are the cosets of C and are deﬁned as
follows for any [n, k]q linear code.
2x + y = (xi + yi | i ∈ (0, n]) if x = (xi | i ∈ (0, n]) and y = (yi | i ∈ (0, n]), where the
addition is modulo q.
3Group codes are not necessarily linear.
4The (n,M, d) notation for general codes is generally replaced by [n, k, d] for linear codes
since k is here the dimension of the subspace. We write [n, k, d]q to specify that the code is
over the ﬁeld Fq.
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Deﬁnition 4.4. Let C be an [n, k]q linear code. For any z ∈ Fnq , the set
z+ C = {z+ c | c ∈ C}
is called a coset of C.
Here are some facts about cosets of a linear code, given without proof as
an analogue of Proposition 3.32.
Proposition 4.5. Let C be an [n, k]q linear code. Then
1. Every vector x must be in some coset of C (e.g. x ∈ x+ C).
2. Two vectors x and y are in the same coset if and only if (x− y) ∈ C.
3. We have z+ C = C if and only if z ∈ C.
4. Two cosets are either disjoint or coincide.
We represent cosets by their minimum weight vectors called leaders. That
is, we write z + C, for a coset with leader z. So ﬁnding which coset a vector
y is in, means ﬁnding the vector z such that y ∈ z+ C. There is an easy way
to do that: by computing the syndrome of y with respect to a parity check
matrix of C.
Deﬁnition 4.6. Let C be a linear [n, k, d]-code over Fq and let H be a parity-
check matrix for C. Then for every x ∈ Fnq the syndrome of x determined by
H, denoted by sH(x), is deﬁned as
sH(x) := xH
tr ∈ Fn−kq .
Proposition 4.7. Let C be a linear [n, k]-code over Fq and let H be a parity-
check matrix for C. Then for every x,y ∈ Fnq :
1. sH(x+ y) = sH(x) + sH(y),
2. x ∈ C if an only if sH(x) = 0,
3. sH(x) = sH(y) if and only if x and y are in the same coset.
Proof. 1. sH(x+ y) = xH
tr + yHtr = sH(x) + sH(y).
2. x ∈ C if and only if xHtr = 0 if and only if sH(x) = 0.
3. sH(x) = sH(y) if and only if xH
tr = yHtr, i.e. (x− y)Htr = 0. Which
is true if and only if x − y ∈ C. Equivalently, by Proposition 4.5 x and
y are in the same coset.
As a consequence of Proposition 4.7, we can deduce the following theorem.
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Theorem 4.8. If C is a linear [n, k]q-code, with parity check matrix H, then
for each s ∈ Fn−kq , the set
C(s) = {x ∈ Fnq |xHtr = s}
coincides with a coset of C and we have
Fnq = unionsqs∈Fn−kq C(s).
Proof. Let z + C be a coset and zHtr = s. By Proposition 4.7: x ∈ z + C if
and only if xHtr = zHtr = s. Thus x ∈ C(s).
Let ΩC be the set of all coset leaders of C.
Proposition 4.9. If C is a linear code with covering radius ρ, then for every
z ∈ ΩC,
wH(z) ≤ ρ.
Proof. Let x ∈ Fnq and s = xHtr. Then we have
C(s) = {y ∈ Fnq |y = x− c, c ∈ C}.







wH(x− c)|c ∈ C}
= wH(z).
If C is a linear code with parity check matrix H, a table containing all the
pairs (z, sH(z)), where z is a coset leader, is called a syndrome decoding array
(SDA).
Example 4.10. Table 4.1 gives the SDA table for the code C in Example 3.1.
For a linear code C, the SDA is built especially for decoding. A decoding
algorithm for linear code C is given in Algorithm 4.2, and called the Standard
array decoding algotithm (SAD).
Eﬃciency of SDA: Sorting the SDA, this procedure takes time O(nk). By
traversing all the cosets and computing the leader and its syndrome, an SAD
takes O(qn) time.
If we denote by cl(s) a leader of the coset C(s), then we can recapitulate
SDA as:
DecC(x) = x− cl(sH(x))
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 4. MATRIX EMBEDDING 38
Table 4.1: The syndrome decoding array (SDA)
z s = zHtr
(0, 0, 0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0)
(0, 0, 0, 0, 1) (1, 1, 0)
(0, 0, 0, 1, 0) (1, 0, 1)
(0, 0, 1, 0, 0) (0, 1, 0)
(0, 1, 0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 1)
(1, 0, 0, 0, 0) (0, 1, 1)
(0, 0, 1, 0, 1) (1, 0, 0)
(0, 0, 1, 1, 0) (1, 1, 1)
Algorithm 4.1 Standard array decoding algorithm (SAD)
1. Given a vector x ∈ Fnq , compute sH(x).
2. Find the coset leader z of C(sH(x)) by looking up sH(x) in the SDA.
3. Output: x− z.
for all x ∈ Fnq , a code linear code C and a parity check matrix H for C.
To deﬁne a stego-scheme from a linear code C, it remains for us to deﬁne
a decoding rule for the cosets of C. By Proposition 3.35: if z+ C is a coset of
C, then a decoding for z+ C is
Decz+C(x) = z+DecC(x− z).
Translating to embedding scheme we have, for all secrets s ∈ Fn−kq and cover-
text x ∈ Fnq
Emb(x, s) = cl(s) +DecC(x− cl(s))
= cl(s) + x− cl(s)− cl(sH(x− cl(s)))
= x− cl(sH(x)− s).
Theorem 4.11. (Fridrich et al., 2007a) Let C be a linear [n, k]q linear code
with parity check matrix H and covering radius ρ. The embedding scheme
below can communicate n − k symbols in a sequence x of length n (x ∈ Fnq )
using at most ρ changes:
Emb(x, s) = x− cl(sH(x)− s) = y,
Ext(y) = sH(y)
for s ∈ Fn−kq and x ∈ Fnq .
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Proof. We ﬁrst prove that the stego-scheme of Theorem 4.11 is well deﬁned,
i.e. satisﬁes Ext(Emb(x, s)) = s.
Ext(Emb(x, s)) = yHtr
= xHtr − (cl(sH(x)− s))Htr
= xHtr − xHtr + s
= s.
Since the code C is a [n, k]-code with covering radius ρ, by Proposition 4.9
we can deduce that
dH(x,y) = wH(cl(sH(x)− s)) ≤ ρ,
which proves that the changes are at most ρ.
A steganographic scheme using matrix embedding from a linear [n, k]q-code
C with parity check matrix H is given by Algorithm 4.2.
Algorithm 4.2 Matrix embedding using linear codes (ME)
1. Given the cover-text x ∈ Fnq , the secret s ∈ Fn−kq and a SDA for C.
2. Compute the syndrome sH(x) = xH
tr.
3. Find in the SDA the leader z corresponding to the syndrome sH(x)−
s ∈ Fn−kq .
4. Embedding: Compute y = x− z.
5. Extraction: Compute the syndrome sH(y) = yH
tr.
Eﬃciency of ME: Similarly to SAD, ME takes time of O(qn).
Example 4.12. Let us use the linear [5, 2]2-code C (of Example 3.1), with the
parity check matrix H given in Example 4.3, to embed 3 bits in a sequence in
B5. If s = (0, 1, 1) is the secret to embedded in the cover-text x = (0, 0, 0, 1, 0)
to embed s, then the Algorithm 4.2 output
y = (0, 0, 0, 1, 0)−cl((1, 0, 1)−(0, 1, 1)) = (0, 0, 0, 1, 0)−cl(1, 1, 0) = (0, 0, 0, 1, 1).
And we can recover s such that
sH(y) = yH
tr = (0, 1, 1) = s.
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4.3 Parameters of Linear Stego-scheme
The performance of a steganographic method can be measured in terms of the
embedding eﬃciency which is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 4.13. The embedding eﬃciency of stego-scheme is the expected
number of embedded random messages bits per one embedding changes. It is
denoted by e and deﬁned by the ratio between the number of message symbols









dH(x, Emb(x, s)). (4.3.2)
The following theorem gives the relative payload and the embedding eﬃ-
ciency of a matrix embedding scheme form a linear code.
Theorem 4.14. The relative payload and the embedding eﬃciency of a linear








where RC is the average distance to the code C.
Proof. The proof of the relative payload follows easily from the deﬁnition of
matrix embedding scheme. To prove the embedding eﬃciency we need to prove
that the average number of embedding changes introduced by the embedding
function is equal to the average distance to the code. The average number of
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The following gives the parameters of a stego-scheme from the binary Ham-
ming code of length n = 2r− 1 (r ≥ 2), dimension k = 2r− 1− r and covering
radius 1. MacWilliams and Sloane (1977) give more details about Hamming
codes.
Example 4.15. (Fridrich and Soukal, 2006) Let H be the check matrix of the
binary [2r − 1, 2r − 1 − r] Hamming code Hr. The parameters of the matrix
embedding scheme form Hk veriﬁes:
α =
r
2r − 1 , e =
r
1− 2−r .
Table 4.2: Relative and embedding eﬃciency for Hamming code-based steganogra-
phy










We can see that embedding eﬃciency increases with r while relative payload
decreases (see Table 4.2). Hamming codes are well suited when the size of the
secret to be embedded is a small fraction of the cover-text, since many bits can
be embedded with a single change (Hamming code are single error-correcting
codes).
There are linear stego-scheme that are perfect. By Theorem 3.37 they arise
from perfect linear codes. Tietäväinen (1973) shows that there are only three









2. The binary [23, 12] Golay code.
3. The ternary [11, 6] Golay code.
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From those codes are built the perfect linear stego-schemes (Zhang and Li,
2005)):
1. The binary linear (23, 211, 3) code.








And since they are perfect, they achieve the bound (3.36) in Chapter 3.




In this chapter we formalize the capacity of a steganographic scheme with
respect to a detection function g, which partition the set An to permissible
and non permissible set.
We use the following notation: random variable are denoted by capital
letters (e.g. X), and their realizations by respective lower case letters (e.g.
x). The domains over that random variables are denoted by script letters
(e.g. A). sequences of n random variables are denoted boldface symbols (e.g.
X = (X1, . . . , Xn)) which takes its values on the product set An.
5.1 Permissible set.
The notion of permissible set is given by Harmsen and Pearlman (2005) in
which they give the deﬁnition of secure steganographic capacity. We ﬁrst deﬁne
the detector function or steganalizer which classiﬁes all output sequences into
permissible and impermissible.
Deﬁnition 5.1. A steganalizer g : An → {0, 1} is a binary function that
classiﬁes the cover set An into two sets: containing steganographic information
and not. That is for all y ∈ An,
g(y) =
{
1 if y is steganographic1
0 otherwise.
(5.1.1)
Let d¯H : An × An → [0, 1] be the normalized Hamming distance on An





where dH(x,y) is the Hamming distance between x and y (see Deﬁnition 3.6).
We can deﬁne the steganalizer induced by d¯H .
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Deﬁnition 5.2. Let D ∈ [0, 1]. The steganalizer induced by d¯H is given such
that for all x,y ∈ A,
gH(y) =
{
0 if d¯H(x,y) ≤ D
1 otherwise.
(5.1.3)
This detection function considers any sequence y ∈ An at Hamming dis-
tance bigger than nD away from the cover-sequence x ∈ An as steganographic.
A steganalyzer partitions An into permissible and impermissible where the
two sets are deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 5.3. For a given steganalizer g, the permissible set Pg ⊆ An is the
inverse image of 0 under g:
Pg := g−1({0}) = {y ∈ An | g(y) = 0}. (5.1.4)
Each element of the permissible set is classiﬁed as non-steganographic. The
set of sequences that are classiﬁed as steganographic are impermissible for g.
Deﬁnition 5.4. For a given steganalizer g, the impermissible set Ig ⊆ An is
the inverse image of 1:
Pg := g−1({1}) = {y ∈ An | g(y) = 1}. (5.1.5)
By deﬁnition, Pg and Ig partition An. That is:
An = Pg ∪ Ig
and
Pg ∩ Ig = ∅.
Lemma 5.5. Let the detector function be gH (see Deﬁnition 5.2) and D ∈
[0, 1]. Then for any cover x ∈ An, the permissible and impermissible sets are
given respectively by
PgH (x) = B(x, nD),
and
IgH (x) = 2B(x, nD).
Proof. For any cover x ∈ An and a real number D ∈ [0, 1], the inverse image
of 0 is
g−1H ({0}) := {y ∈ An|gH(y) = 0} by deﬁnition of inverse image
= {y ∈ An|d¯H(x,y) ≤ D} by Equation 5.1.3
= {y ∈ An|dH(x,y) ≤ nD} by Equation 5.1.2
= B(x, nD).
2B(x, nD) denotes the complement set of B(x, nD).
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Similarly, the inverse image of 1 is
g−1H ({1}) := {y ∈ An|gH(y) = 1}
= {y ∈ An|d¯H(x,y) > D}
= {y ∈ An|dH(x,y) > nD}
= B(x, nD)
which is the complement of B(x, nD), hence satisﬁes
B(x, nD) ∪B(x, nD) = An
and
B(x, nD) ∩B(x, nD) = ∅.
Given a cover-sequence x ∈ A and an integer d ≥ 0, for any y ∈ An, the
steganalyzer gH is equivalent to
g(y) =
{
0 if d(x,y) ≤ D
1 otherwise
(5.1.6)
Then the permissible set is the set of all sequences that are distance at most
d away from the cover. That is
Pg = {y ∈ A|dH(x,y) ≤ d}
:= B(x, d).
5.2 Steganographic capacity
We model the cover as a sequence X = (X1, . . . , Xn) of independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) samples drawn from a probability mass function
pX(x). The message M is to be embedded in X and transmitted. M is
uniformly distributed over a message setM. The embedding function produces
a stego-sequenceY in order to transmit the messageM reliably. The cover and
stego-sequence are required to be close according to some distortion metric.
Deﬁnition 5.6. A distortion function for the steganographer is a non negative








for x = (x1, . . . , xn) and y = (y1, . . . , yn).
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We assume without loss of generality that d(x, y) ≥ 0, with equality if
x = y and max
x,y
d(x, y) <∞. The classical distortion function is the Hamming
distance.
Deﬁnition 5.7. (Moulin and O'Sullivan, 2003) A steganographic scheme sub-
ject to distortion D is a triplet (Emb,Ext,M) where
 M is the message set;
 Emb : An ×M → An is the embedding function subject to distortion
constraint D, i.e. for all x ∈ An and s ∈M
d(x, fn(x, s)) ≤ D; (5.2.2)
 Ext : An →M is the extracting function.
An (n,M, δ)-code consists of an embedding and extracting functions such
that the encoder is capable of transferring one of theM secrets using a sequence
of length n with a probability of detection less than δ.
Deﬁnition 5.8. Given a steganalizer g, a sequence y ∈ An is called δ-secure
if
Pr(g(y) = 1) ≤ δ. (5.2.3)
The set, Tδ, of all δ-secure sequences is
Tδ := {Y|PY(Ig) ≤ δ}. (5.2.4)
For δ = 0, the set T0 is called the secure output set.
Lemma 5.9. Given g, a secure output Y ∈ T0 is permissible, i.e. Y ∈ Pg.
Proof.
T0 := {Y|PY (Ig) = 0}
= {Y|PY (Pg) = 1}
= {Y|g(Y) = 0}
= {Y ∈ Pg}.
If the detection function is gH (see Deﬁnition 5.2) and the cover set An is
uniformly distributed, then for any cover x ∈ An and any real D ∈ [0, 1]









(|A| − 1)i, (5.2.6)
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then
Pr(y ∈ B(x, nD)) = 1|An| −∑nDi=0 (ni)(|A| − 1)i . (5.2.7)
The perfectly secure output set is
T0 = {y ∈ An|Pr(g(y) = 1) = 0} (5.2.8)
= B(x, nD). (5.2.9)
For a given δ, we can derive the cardinality of the permissible (or imper-
missible) set. Moreover if the detector function is gH (see Deﬁnition 5.2), then
we can derive the volume of the ball and therefore the maximum D such that
B(x, nD) ⊆ PgH (x), for all cover x ∈ An.
The capacity of a steganographic scheme is the maximum of all achievable
rate, where rate is deﬁned as follows:





Harmsen and Pearlman (2005) deﬁne secure steganographic capacity as
follows:





Theorem 5.12. For the staganalyzer g, the secure capacity is given by
C(g) = log2 |Pg|. (5.2.12)
Proof. The maximum in Deﬁnition 5.11 is achieved if Y is uniformly dis-
tributed over the permissible set Pg (see Lemma 5.9). Thus the capacity
satisﬁes
C(g) = log2 |Pg|. (5.2.13)
5.3 Examples
Now let us ﬁnd the capacity of some steganalizers.
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5.3.1 Typical set steganalizer
If the type stego-sequence is the same as the cover-sequence distribution, then
it is considered non-steganographic.
Assume that PX is the distribution over the ﬁnite alphabet A. Let x ∈ An
be a sequence chosen by the detector to deﬁne a steganalizer which is deﬁned
as follows:




1 if Py 6= Px
0 if Py = Px
if Py is the type of the sequence y.
The permissible set for gx is equal to the type class of Px, i.e.,
Pgx = T (Px)
:= {y ∈ An|Py = Px} .
Theorem 5.14. The capacity of the typical set (see Appendix B) steganalizer
speciﬁed by the sequence x ∈ An is given by
C(gx) = H(X). (5.3.1)
Proof. The steganographic capacity given the steganalizer gx is
C(gx) := log2 |Pgx| by Theorem 5.12





where X is n i.i.d. realizations of the random variable X over A.
5.3.2 Bernouilli Hamming case
Here we consider A = {0, 1} and the distortion to be the Hamming distance.






In this case, the capacity of a steganographic scheme with distortion con-
straint D, such that the steganalizer gH is induced by Hamming distance, is
given by Moulin and O'Sullivan (2003) as follows:





-Hamming with distortion constraint D, the
hiding capacity is
C(gH , D) =
{






where H(D) = −D log2D − (1−D) log2(1−D).
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From Lemma 5.15, a bound on the length of binary stego-schemes can be
derived.













Proof. By construction (see Chapter 4), a stego-scheme derived from a binary
linear [n, k, ρ]-covering code has rate equal to n−k
n
. By deﬁnition of capacity,
n−k
n
≤ C(D), such thatD is the maximum distortion, i.e. nD is the embedding












For the stego-scheme arising from the binary Hamming [2r − 1, 2r − 1 −
r]-code (see Example 4.15), the rate is r
2r−1 . Since the covering radius of

















. Actually, this bound is similar to the bound given in
Theorem 3.41 of Chapter 3.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
The main goal of this thesis has been to reformalise the construction of em-
bedding schemes with small embedding distortion in order to increase the
embedding eﬃciency and decrease the chance of detection. It was ﬁrstly no-
ticed by Crandall (1998) and Bierbrauer (1998) that linear codes can be trans-
formed into a hiding scheme with small distortion. Since, researchers started
to study the link between coding theory and steganography. Most results are
on steganographic schemes based on binary error correcting codes. But in this
work we have presented the general concept of the design of a stego-scheme
with small embedding distortion.
We have seen that the construction of steganographic schemes with high
embedding eﬃciency (or small embedding distortion) depends mostly on the
extracting function Ext : X →M. The latter is equivalent to an |M|-partition
of the cover set X and the embedding radius (or the maximum embedding dis-
tortion) of the scheme is the covering radius of the |M|-partition. Therefore
we need to choose an |M|-partition with smallest covering radius. The embed-
ding function has also its role to improve the eﬃciency of the stego-scheme.
For the stego and the cover to be as close as possible, the embedding func-
tion, Emb, must satisfy the maximum likelihood decoding problem. It ﬁnds
a nearest element to the cover in the corresponding subset Xs ⊆ X , where
Xs = Ext−1({s}).
Note that the subsets in an |M|-partition of X need not have the same
cardinality. All that we required is for the covering radius to be small.
The relationship between coding theory and steganopgraphy has been given
in Chapter 3 as a speciﬁcation of the previous method, where the covers are
strings of symbols (of length n) from a ﬁnite alphabet A that has a structure
of an Abelian group. The cover set is the set of all n-tuples An and the set
of secrets isM. Then we consider the |M|-partition of An to be the quotient
space An/C (C is a subgroup of An), where C is a block code deﬁned on A. The
advantage of this construction is that the decoding procedure on each coset
(elements of the An/C) derives only from the decoding map of the code C. We
can derive some bounds on the performance of stego-schemes from codes (or
50
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code-based stego-scheme) by applying some classic bounds in coding theory.
Crandall's discovery, matrix embedding, is presented in Chapter 4, which
uses linear codes to embed data. In this case secrets and covers are strings from
the ﬁnite ﬁeld Fq (q a power of a prime) but with diﬀerent length, say k and
n respectively. The secret is extracted as syndrome of the received stego-text,
with respect to a parity check matrix of the linear code. We have derived in
this method the correspondence between the parameters of the stego-schemes
and linear codes.
The last chapter focuses on the capacity of a stego-scheme, where we gave
some examples. We have seen in this part that even though the capacity of
a steganographic source is not easy to compute, the capacity of the Bernoulli
Hamming source and the upper bound of the rate in Chapter 3 coincide. So it
might be possible that bounds provided by coding theoretic methods answer
the problem of ﬁnding the capacity for a general source.
We justiﬁed in the concluding that coding theory is useful in steganogarphy
more generally than previously studied. In particular it has enabled us to
address and answer questions such as the maximum number of changes needed
to embed a secret, and the maximum embeddable secret length.
There are still many other problems remaining, such as the bounds on the
length of the stego-scheme, which is deﬁned by the length of the cover, the
construction of fast embedding algorithms and the construction of schemes
that approach the hiding capacity.
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Appendix A
Entropy function
Deﬁnition A.1. Let q > 1 be an integer and 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 be a real. Then the
q-ary entropy function is deﬁned as follows:
Hq(p) = p logq(q − 1)− p logq(p)− (1− p) logq(1− p).
If q = 2, the binary entropy function is given by
H(p) = −p log2 p− (1− p) log2(1− p).
The function Hq is continuous and increasing in the interval [0, 1 − 1/q]
with the convention: Hq(0) = 0 and Hq(1 − 1/q) = 1. Figure A.1 gives a
representation of the Hq(.) for the some few values of q. It shows that the
binary entropy function is symmetric around the line p = 1/2: H(1 − p) =
H(p).
Figure A.1: A plot of Hq for q = 2, 3, 4, 5.
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Appendix B
Typical set
The main result of the method of the type given in (Cover and Thomas, 2012)
states that the outputs of n independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
realizations of random variables X can be partitioned into two sets, typical
and non-typical, where the probability of the typical set is nearly 1, moreover
the typical set is equally distributed and has nearly 2nH(X) elements, called
typical sequences. That result can be applied to our concept in such a way
that the detection function classiﬁes any sequence that is outside the typical
set as steganographic.
Let X be a ﬁnite alphabet and n ∈ N. Let xn be a sequence of n symbols
from a ﬁnite alphabet X .
Deﬁnition B.1. The type of a sequence x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X n is the probabil-
ity mass function Px deﬁned as the relative proportion of occurrences of each





where Nx(a) = |{i|xi = a}| is the number of times the symbol a occurs in the
sequence x ∈ X n.








Deﬁnition B.3. The set of all possible types of sequences x ∈ X n is denoted
by Pn(X ).
Similarly we deﬁne the joint type of two sequences as follows.
Deﬁnition B.4. The joint type of two sequences x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X n and
y = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ Yn is the probability distribution Pxy ∈ P(X × Y) deﬁned
as the relative proportion of occurrences of each pair (a, b) ∈ X ×Y among the
(xi, yi) for all i ∈ [1, n].
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|0 ≤ i ≤ n
}
. (B.0.2)
Deﬁnition B.6. Let P ∈ Pn. Then the set of sequences of length n and type
P is called the type class of P , denoted T (P ), i.e.
T (P ) = {x ∈ X n|Px = P}. (B.0.3)
Example B.7. Let X = {0, 1} and x = (1, 0, 0, 1, 0). The type class of Px is
the set of all sequences of length 5 with three 0's and two 1's. There are 10 of
them
T (Px) = {x ∈ X 5|Nx(1)=2}.
Now assume that the sequence X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xn) is drawn i.i.d. ac-
cording to a distribution Q(x). Then all sequences of the same type have the
same probability.
Theorem B.8. If X1, X2, . . . , Xn are drawn i.i.d. according to Q(x), then the
probability of x depends only on its type and is given by


































(−Px(a) log Px(a)Q(a) +Px(a) logPx(a))
= 2n(D(Px||Q)−H(Px)).
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Corollary B.9. If x is in the type class of Q, then
Qn(x) = 2−nH(Q). (B.0.5)
Proof. If x ∈ T (Q), then Px = Q. Substituting to (B.8) we obtain the result.
The size |T (P )| of a type class is the number of ways of arranging nP (a1), . . . , nP (a|X |)
objects in a sequence, which is the multinomial coeﬃcient
|T (P )| =
(
n
nP (a1), . . . , nP (a|X |)
)
. (B.0.6)
Theorem B.10. For any type P ∈ Pn, the size of the type class of P can be
estimated as follows:
|T (P )| ' 2nH(P ). (B.0.7)
Lemma B.11. For X = B, the type is deﬁned by the weight of a sequence,









≤ 2nH( kn). (B.0.8)


































































≤ 2nH( kn). (B.0.10)
Theorem B.12. For any type P ∈ Pn and any distribution Q, the probability
of the type class T (P ) under Q satisﬁes
Q(T (P )) ≤ 2nD(P ||Q). (B.0.11)
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Proof. We have








= |T (P )|2−n(D(P ||Q)+H(P )).
Using the bounds on T (P ), we have
Q(T (P )) ≤ 2nD(P ||Q). (B.0.12)
Given any  > 0, we can deﬁne a typical set T Q for the distribution Q as
T Q = {x ∈ X n|D(Px||Q) ≤ }. (B.0.13)

















which goes to 0 as n tends to ∞, and then the probability of the typical set
goes to 1.
Theorem B.13. Let X1, X2, . . . , Xn be i.i.d. according to P (x). Then
Pr{D(Px||P ) > } ≤ 2−n(−|X |
log(n−1)
n ). (B.0.19)
Thus D(Px||P ) −→ 0 with probability 1.
Proof. Summing over n, we ﬁnd that
∞∑
n=1
Pr{D(Px||P ) > } <∞. (B.0.20)
Thus the expected number of occurrences of the even D(Px||P ) >  for all n
ﬁnite, which implies that the actual number of such occurences is also ﬁnite
with probability 1. Hence D(Px||P ) −→ 0 with probability 1.
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A stronger version of typicality is given as follows.
Deﬁnition B.14. The strongly typical set A is the set of sequences in X n for
which the frequencies are close to the true values, i.e.,
A =
{
x ∈ X n|
∣∣∣∣ 1nNx(a)− P (a)
∣∣∣∣ < |X | , for all a ∈ X
}
. (B.0.21)
The typical set consists of sequences whose type does not diﬀer from the
true probabilities by more than |X | in any component. By the strong law of
large numbers it follows that the probability of the strongly typical set goes
to 1 as n increases.
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